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DEFINING AND REGULATING 
CRYPTOCURRENCY: FAKE INTERNET MONEY 
OR LEGITIMATE MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE?  
SUSAN ALKADRI†  
ABSTRACT 
Digitalization makes almost everything quicker, sleeker, and 
more efficient. Many argue cryptocurrency is the future of money 
and payment transfers. This paper explores how the unique nature 
of cryptocurrencies creates barriers to a strict application of 
traditional regulatory strategies. Indeed, state and federal 
regulators remain uncertain if and how they can regulate this 
cutting-edge technology. Cryptocurrency businesses face 
difficulty navigating the unclear regulatory landscape, and 
consumers frequently fall prey to misinformation. To reconcile 
these concerns, this paper asserts cryptocurrency functions as 
“currency” or “money” and should be treated as such for 
regulatory purposes. It also proposes each state implement a 
uniform cryptocurrency-specific framework following the 
Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Business Act. Such a 
harmonious approach would reduce compliance costs for 
cryptocurrency businesses, protect consumers, and provide 
satisfactory state and federal oversight. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the final weeks of 2017, cryptocurrency1 mania skyrocketed, 
garnering widespread media attention and consumer interest. As a result, 
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1 This paper uses the term “cryptocurrency” to refer to decentralized virtual 
currencies utilizing a “cryptographic protocol that manages the creation of new 
units of the currency through a peer-to-peer network . . . [where creation] happens 
through a process called mining.” For a straightforward explanation and 
comparison of centralized and decentralized virtual currencies, see TEX. DEP’T OF 
BANKING, SUPERVISORY MEMORANDUM 1037, REGULATORY TREATMENT OF 
VIRTUAL CURRENCIES UNDER THE TEXAS MONEY SERVICES ACT (2014) 
[hereinafter “Memorandum 1037”]. Original terminology, such as “digital” or 
“virtual currency,” is retained in any statutory or proposed definitions. The 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an independent inter-governmental body 
that investigates and recommends global anti-money laundering (AML) and 
counter-terrorism financing (CTF) standards, has also issued a useful report 
defining types of virtual currencies.  FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, FATF REPORT: 
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the global market capitalization of all cryptocurrencies passed $700 billion 
in January 2018, reaching an all-time high.2 Presently, most 
cryptocurrency trading3 is done by small, retail investors using centralized 
cryptocurrency trading venues (“exchanges”).4 Emboldened by the frenzy, 
some individuals initiated second home mortgages to invest in Bitcoin, the 
first and best-known cryptocurrency.5  
Cryptocurrency has been heralded for its many benefits, including 
increased payment efficiency, reduced transaction costs, and facilitation 
of international payments.6 Moreover, the blockchain technology 
underlying Bitcoin is completely operable without third-party 
intervention.7 Hard-line cryptocurrency proponents are fearful that 
                                                      
VIRTUAL CURRENCIES:  KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL AML/CFT RISKS 
(2014), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/ 
reports/Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf 
[hereinafter “FATF Report”]. 
2 Will Martin, The global cryptocurrency market hit a new record high above 
$700 billion, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 3, 2018), http://www.businessinsider.com/ 
bitcoin-price-global-cryptocurrency-market-capitalisation-january-3-2018-1.  
3 As used in this paper, “trading” refers to the exchange of traditional legal tender, 
e.g. fiat currency such as the U.S. Dollar (U.S.D.), for a cryptocurrency, as well 
as the exchange of one cryptocurrency for another. 
4 Oscar Williams-Grut, The cryptocurrency market is now doing the same daily 
volume as the New York Stock Exchange, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 20, 2017), 
http://markets.businessinsider.com/currencies/news/daily-cryptocurrency-
volumes-vs-stock-market-volumes-2017-12-1011680451. Unless otherwise 
noted, this paper uses the term “exchange” as it is understood colloquially by 
cryptocurrency users, businesses, and analysts; i.e., in reference to online 
cryptocurrency trading venues where consumers can initiate a purchase or sale of 
the instruments themselves, as opposed to purchase and sale of cryptocurrency-
based derivatives such as options and futures.  
5 See Chris Morris, Some Bitcoin Investors Are Mortgaging Their Homes to Buy 
More Digital Currency, FORTUNE (Dec. 12, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/ 
12/12/bitcoin-investors-mortgages/ (discussing securities regulator Joseph Borg’s 
observation that investors ran up credit card debt and mortgaged their homes to 
buy into Bitcoin at the height of its price spike in December 2017). 
6 See, e.g. Marc Andreessen, Why Bitcoin Matters, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 
21, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-bitcoin-matters/?_r-0 
(discussing the function, appeal, and potential uses of bitcoin and underlying 
blockchain technology). The FATF recognizes the legitimate use of 
cryptocurrencies.  FATF Report, supra note 1 at 8–9. 
7 The Bitcoin White Paper describes the technology as “[a] purely peer-to-peer 
version of electronic cash” where “online payments [are] sent directly from one 
party to another without going through a financial institution,” and emphasizes 
the importance of information privacy achieved through keeping public 
transaction logs anonymous. SATOSHI NAKAMOTO, BITCOIN: A PEER-TO-PEER- 
ELECTRONIC CASH SYSTEM (2008), available at https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf. 
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regulation may place an undue burden on technological development,8 and 
are wary of intervention by sovereign governments, regulatory bodies, and 
financial institutions, as these entities are viewed as uneducated on the 
complex technology.9 Further, there is an underlying distrust of 
governments and financial institutions to responsibly handle consumer 
money in a financial crisis.10 Some argue that decentralized 
cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and the underlying distributed ledger 
technology are inherently incapable of efficient regulation.11 
However, increased investor interest in cryptocurrencies and the 
pseudonymous nature of decentralized cryptocurrencies are exactly why 
regulators are so wary of this technology. Regulators are concerned with 
misinformed investments,12 market fraud and manipulation,13 
destabilization of the global economy,14 and its use for illicit purposes such 
                                                      
8 See, e.g., Bloomberg, Washington Is Trying to Regulate Bitcoin. These People 
Are Trying to Stop It, FORTUNE (Dec. 14, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/ 
12/14/new-bitcoin-restrictions/ (describing pro-cryptocurrency advocacy groups’ 
lobbying efforts against what they view as unnecessary and restrictive 
contemplated regulation). 
9 Id.; see also Jon Martindale, Go ahead, pass laws. They can’t kill bitcoin, even 
if they try, DIGITAL TRENDS (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www.digitaltrends.com/ 
computing/dont-worry-about-bitcoin-regulation-it-cant-be-stopped/ (touting the 
low transaction costs, efficiency, and pseudonymous nature of decentralized 
cryptocurrency). 
10 See Danny Bradbury, Bitcoin and Financial Crises: Bitcoin as a Safe Haven in 
an Economic Storm, THE BALANCE, https://www.thebalance.com/is-bitcoin-the-
answer-in-a-financial-crisis-391275 (last updated Dec. 3, 2018) (Countries 
experiencing a financial crisis “often tighten their financial thumbscrews,” 
limiting their population’s access to cash). 
11 See Martindale, supra note 9 (government regulation of cryptocurrency itself is 
futile due to decentralization and availability of circumvention measures such as 
VPNs or proxy systems); but see B.G., Bitcoin is fiat money, too, ECONOMIST 
(Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.economist.com/free-exchange/2017/09/22/bitcoin-
is-fiat-money-too (“The developers behind distributed ledgers [ ] talk as if 
governance is something they are beyond. They are not.”). 
12 See, e.g., Jay Clayton & J. Christopher Giancarlo, Regulators Are Looking at 
Cryptocurrency: At the SEC and CFTC, We Take Our Responsibility Seriously, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-are-
looking-at-cryptocurrency-1516836363 (comparing the cryptocurrency craze to 
the dot-com bubble of the 1990s, and stating that “experience tells us that while 
some market participants may make fortunes, the risks to all investors are high. 
Caution is merited.”). 
13 Id. 
14 See, e.g., Camilla Hodgson, Bitcoin could trigger the next financial crisis, 
BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 22, 2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/bitcoin-
could-trigger-financial-crisis-2017-12 (cautioning that without regulation, 
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as money laundering and terrorism financing.15 As a result, federal and 
state lawmakers in the United States are scrambling to determine what 
regulatory framework would best fit this technology.  
This paper explores how the unique nature of cryptocurrency 
creates barriers to a strict application of traditional regulatory strategies. It 
asserts that decentralized cryptocurrencies function as currency or money, 
and proposes state-based regulation of cryptocurrency business 
intermediaries analogous to Money Transmission Services (MTSs), a 
subset of Money Service Businesses (MSBs).16  This paper examines the 
current state of cryptocurrency exchange and money transfer platform 
regulation, specifically how the states of New York, California, and Texas 
                                                      
cryptocurrencies have potential to destabilize the global financial system); c.f. 
Rakesh Sharma, Jerome Powell: Cryptocurrencies Aren't Big Enough to Matter 
Yet, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/news/jerome-powell-
cryptocurrencies-arent-big-enough-matter-yet/ (last updated Nov. 29, 2017) 
(summarizing Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell’s November 2017 
Senate testimony where he suggested the cryptocurrency market was not yet large 
enough to affect the mainstream economy, but noting his agency continues to 
“monitor[] cryptocurrencies ‘very carefully’”). 
15 See FATF Report, supra note 1, (detailing potential risks); see also Angela 
Monaghan, Bitcoin is a fraud that will blow up, says JP Morgan boss, THE 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 13 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2017/sep/13/bitcoin-fraud-jp-morgan-cryptocurrency-drug-dealers 
(discussing JP Morgan chairman and CEO Jamie Dimon’s opinion that 
cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin is “only fit for use by drug dealers, murderers and 
people living in places such as North Korea.”). 
16 This paper focuses on state-implemented regulatory oversight of 
cryptocurrency businesses as—or analogously to—MTSs. Competing theories of 
classification exist. Individual cryptocurrencies may fit within other regulatory 
frameworks outside the analytical scope of this paper. For example, U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Jay Clayton and 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Chairman J. Christopher 
Giancarlo question whether the “historical approach to the regulation of currency 
transactions is appropriate for the cryptocurrency markets.” The SEC is also 
monitoring Initial Coin Offerings (“ICOs”) for cryptocurrencies that qualify as 
securities subject to federal regulation. See, e.g., Jay Clayton, Statement on 
Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 
11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-
12-11 (“Tokens and offerings that incorporate features and marketing efforts that 
emphasize the potential for profits based on the entrepreneurial or managerial 
efforts of others continue to contain the hallmarks of a security under U.S. law.”). 
In 2015, the CFTC concluded “Bitcoin and other virtual currencies” fit within the 
definition of “commodity” in Section 1a(9) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 
U.S.C. §§ 6c(b) and 7b-3(a)(1) (2018). See In re Coinflip, Inc., d/b/a Derivabit, 
and Francisco Riordan, CFTC No. 15-29, at 3 (Sept. 17, 2015) [hereinafter 
“Derivabit”]. 
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have applied their respective MTS/MSB Blue Sky laws—or variants 
thereof—to different types of cryptocurrency exchanges, and why a 
traditional MTS/MSB regulatory framework is incomplete. The analysis 
also considers interstate reciprocity and uniformity efforts by two 
pertinent policy-shaping organizations: the Conference of State Bank 
Supervisors (CSBS) and the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws.  
Some degree of regulation is necessary to prevent criminal activity 
and misinformed investments. This paper proposes that the 50 states 
implement a cryptocurrency-specific framework based on the Uniform 
Regulation of Virtual-Currency Business Act (URVCBA).17 At the very 
least, individual states should pass legislative amendments clarifying the 
applicability of existing state MTS laws to cryptocurrency businesses. 
Either approach must be augmented with required reporting to the U.S. 
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the IRS, and state tax 
boards, as applicable. Such a coordinated regulatory framework strikes a 
balance between encouraging technological innovation, maintaining 
market stability, and ensuring consumer protection.   
I. WHAT ARE DECENTRALIZED CRYPTOCURRENCIES? 
The proper regulatory framework for this (relatively) new 
phenomenon is contingent on how cryptocurrencies are classified. Though 
plausible arguments have been proffered that cryptocurrencies are distinct 
from traditional fiat currencies and could destabilize the global financial 
market,18 proponents of cryptocurrency insist the instruments function 
analogously—and should be treated identically—to traditional “fiat” 
currency.19 Many hope to see payments in cryptocurrencies one day 
become the international standard.20 This Part examines current statutory 
definitions of “currency,” “money,” and crypto (“virtual”) currency at the 
federal and state level, as well as scholarly positions against classification 
of cryptocurrency as “currency” or “money.” It concludes that while 
cryptocurrencies may not fit within the traditional legal definitions of 
currency or money, they function as such. Presuming cryptocurrencies 
                                                      
17 UNIF. REGULATION OF VIRTUAL-CURRENCY BUS.’S ACT 10 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2017), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/regulation%20of%20 
virtual%20currencies/URVCBA_Final_2017oct9.pdf [hereinafter “URVCBA”]. 
18 See infra notes 33–36 and accompanying text. 
19 See, e.g., Ameer Rosic, What is Cryptocurrency: Everything You Must Need To 
Know!, BLOCKGEEKS, https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-cryptocurrency/ 
(last updated Sept. 13, 2018) (arguments for cryptocurrency as “digital cash”).  
20 See, e.g., Martindale, supra note 9 (“Many people see cryptocurrencies like 
bitcoin as an evolution of existing currency  
. . . . Digital transactions online and in person preclude the typical need for real-
world money.”). 
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should be classified as money, Part II proposes a suitable regulatory 
framework. 
A. The Limited Scope of Current Statutory Definitions 
Cryptocurrencies do not neatly fit into the present legal definitions 
or interpretations of “currency” or “money” in the United States. On 
several occasions, federal regulators have distinguished cryptocurrency 
from traditional or “real” currency. For example, in 2013, FinCEN issued 
interpretive guidance defining “real” currency as “the coin and paper 
money of the United States or of any other country that [i] is designated as 
legal tender and that [ii] circulates and [iii] is customarily used and 
accepted as a medium of exchange in the country of issuance.”21 
Conceding that “‘virtual’ currency is a medium of exchange that operates 
like a currency in some environments,” the agency nonetheless stressed 
that cryptocurrency “does not have legal tender status in any 
jurisdiction.”22 
Individual states’ definitions align with their federal counterparts. 
California defines “money” as “a medium of exchange that is authorized 
or adopted by the United States or a foreign government.”23 The Texas 
Finance Code defines “currency” for the purposes of “currency exchange” 
as “the coin and paper money of [any country] that is designated as legal 
tender and . . . customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in 
the country of issuance.”24 Texas regulators also conclude that 
cryptocurrencies do not fit under the current definition of “money or 
monetary value” in the Money Services Act.25 Presently, no 
                                                      
21 FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, FIN-2013-GOO 1, 
APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING, 
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (Mar. 18, 2013) (citing 31 C.F.R. 
§ 1010.100(m) (2014)). 
22 Id. For similar definitions of virtual currency, see Derivabit, supra note 16 at 2 
n.2 (acknowledging cryptocurrency such as bitcoin as “a digital representation of 
value that functions as a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and/or a store of 
value,” but noting that unlike traditional or “real” currency, cryptocurrencies “do[ 
] not have legal tender status in any jurisdiction.”).  
23 CAL. FIN. CODE § 2003(p) (West 2017). 
24 TEX. FIN. CODE § 151.501(b)(1) (West 2017). Cryptocurrencies are not 
negotiable instruments, thus failing to satisfy the second definition of currency 
exchange in Texas.  
25 Memorandum 1037, supra note 1 at 3. As used in the Act, “money” or 
“monetary value” refer to “currency or a claim that can be converted into currency 
through a financial institution, electronic payments network, or other formal or 
informal payment system.” TEX. FIN. CODE §151.301(b)(3) (West 2017). 
Moreover, cryptocurrency is neither a “currency” as used in the Code, nor a 
“claim” as used in the Act. See Memorandum 1037, supra note 1 at 3 (stating the 
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cryptocurrency meets either California or Texas’s definitions of “money” 
or “currency”—though if a sovereign government chose to designate a 
cryptocurrency as legal tender, and the currency became a widely used 
medium of exchange (as many cryptocurrency enthusiasts hope), the 
instruments could certainly fall into these existing statutory frameworks. 
New York, on the other hand, explicitly defines and differentiates 
both traditional fiat currency and virtual or cryptocurrency in its codified 
regulations:26  
Fiat Currency means government-issued currency that is 
designated as legal tender in its country of issuance through 
government decree, regulation, or law.27 
* * * 
Virtual Currency means any type of digital unit that is used as a 
medium of exchange or a form of digitally stored value. Virtual 
Currency shall be broadly construed to include digital units of 
exchange that (i) have a centralized repository or administrator; (ii) 
are decentralized and have no centralized repository or administrator; 
or (iii) may be created or obtained by computing or manufacturing 
effort.28 
As shown above, neither states nor the federal government have 
accorded cryptocurrency the same status as fiat currency or money. 
Nonetheless, this framework is increasingly called into question as 
cryptocurrency use expands.  
B. How Cryptocurrency Functions as Money 
Despite not conforming to traditional definitions of “currency” or 
“money,” particularly the qualification as legal tender, cryptocurrencies 
should be treated as such. Cryptocurrencies function as a method “of 
transferring value from one person to another.”29 The instruments can be 
                                                      
legal definition of a claim to be “a right enforceable by a court”) (citing Black’s 
Law Dictionary 264 (8th Ed. 2004)). 
26 New York’s regulatory treatment of cryptocurrency businesses is discussed 
infra in Part II. New York’s money transmission statute covers “payment 
instruments.” N.Y. BANKING LAW § 640 (McKinney 2011). 
27 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.2(e) (Current through July 31, 
2018) (emphasis in original). 
28 Id. at § 200.2(p) (emphasis in original). 
29 John L. Douglas, New Wine into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank 
Regulatory World, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 17, 39 (2016).  
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directly transferred peer-to-peer,30 function as vehicles for international 
remittance,31 and used as a payment option at some major retailers.32   
Some criticize cryptocurrencies as less desirable than traditional 
or fiat currency because the instruments are not backed by a physical 
commodity (e.g., gold) or the full faith of a sovereign government (e.g., 
the U.S. and E.U. guarantee of the U.S. dollar and Euro, respectively).33 
For example, Professor Hilary J. Allen considers cryptocurrency privately 
issued money, and is concerned the volatile nature of these instruments 
may affect the global financial market.34 Allen asserts that 
cryptocurrencies “are inherently fragile because they are nothing more 
than a series of numbers recorded on a database, and have no worth as an 
asset class other than their ability to facilitate transactions.”35 Like others, 
Allen recognizes that the value of cryptocurrency stems from “people[’s] 
belie[f] that others will be willing to accept the virtual currency in 
exchange for other goods and services.”36  
                                                      
30 See, e.g., discussion of Memorandum 1037, supra note 1. 
31 Instead of transferring a given cryptocurrency itself, some businesses instead 
accept a user-sender’s fiat money, use it to purchase a corresponding amount of 
cryptocurrency (such as bitcoin), then sell the cryptocurrency for the fiat currency 
of the receiving nation, remitting the fiat to the user-recipient. For a description 
on the overseas bitcoin remittance business, see Shobhit Seth, Bitcoin's Most 
Profitable Use: the $600 Billion Overseas Remittance Business?, INVESTOPEDIA 
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/tech/bitcoins-best-use-isnt-
currency-its-overseas-remittances/. 
32 Elise Moreau, 15 Major Retailers and Services That Accept Bitcoin, LIFEWIRE, 
https://www.lifewire.com/big-sites-that-accept-bitcoin-payments-3485965 (last 
updated Nov. 4, 2018). 
33 See, e.g. Hilary J. Allen, $=€=BITCOIN?, 76 MD. L. REV. 877, 880–89 (2017) 
(arguments why cryptocurrencies fit neither the legal nor functional definition of 
“currency” or “money”). 
34 Id. at 881. 
35 Id. (citing Paul Krugman, Bits and Barbarism, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/23/opinion/krugman-bits-and-barbarism.html; 
see also Paul Vigna, Howard Marks Trashes Bitcoin: ‘An Unfounded Fad’, WALL 
ST. J. (Jul. 27, 2017), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2017/07/27/howard-
marks-trashes-bitcoin-an-unfounded-fad/ (quoting an investment letter by 
Howard Marks, co-founder of Oaktree Capital Management, stating: “[B]itcoin is 
really no more than ‘an unfounded fad (or perhaps even a pyramid scheme), based 
on a willingness to ascribe value to something that has little or none beyond what 
people will pay for it.’”). 
36 Allen, supra note 33 at 881; see also Douglas, supra note 29 at 40 (musing the 
willingness of individuals to accept cryptocurrencies as a method of payment 
“appears to hinge on the ability to exchange the digital currency for legal tender”).  
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These arguments are compelling, and it is true cryptocurrency 
values are volatile.37 However, any insinuation that a string of computer 
code is an inherently less valid or legitimate representation of value than 
a piece of paper is misguided. The only real value attached to any 
instrument functioning as a currency—whether a tangible metal coin or 
paper note, or an intangible series of 1s and 0s comprising the code behind 
thousands of cryptocurrencies—is the ability and willingness of others to 
use the instrument as a form of exchange.38 Normative value judgments 
are not necessarily dictated by the characteristics of the medium itself. To 
illustrate, one U.S. dollar bill ($1 U.S.D.) is printed on exactly the same 
type of paper, of the same length, width, thickness, and consistency, as a 
one hundred U.S. dollar bill ($100 U.S.D.).39 Watermarks and holograms 
aside, the key distinction between these two pieces of paper is that most 
(if not all) people value the piece of paper with the “one hundred dollars” 
stamp 100x more than the paper with a “one dollar” stamp. As a result, it 
has more purchasing or exchange power.40 Similarly, if I alone value 
antique brass buttons, and am willing to exchange goods and services or 
traditional currency to obtain them, it would be far-fetched to classify such 
buttons as currency or money. However, should I convince hundreds or 
thousands of others of the value behind brass buttons, this classification 
becomes much more appropriate. Because a significant number of people 
and businesses use cryptocurrencies to transfer value from one party to 
another,41 cryptocurrencies function as—and should be regulated as or 
analogously to—traditional currency or money. 
 
 
 
                                                      
37 See, e.g., Ruzbeh Bacha, Cryptocurrency — Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, 
Litecoin — Everything You Need to Know in 2017, MEDIUM (May 22, 2017), 
https://medium.com/cryptolinks/cryptocurrency-bitcoin-ethereum-ripple-
litecoin-everything-you-need-to-know-in-2017-28109d927037 (concluding 
volatility partially due to lack of a stabilizing central entity and acknowledging 
fragmentation as one of the largest problems with cryptocurrency such as 
Bitcoin). 
38 See id. (pointing out the majority of fiat currencies also “only exist as numbers 
in a computer system”). 
39 USA Currency Bills, IMMIHELP https://www.immihelp.com/ 
newcomer/usa-currency-bills.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2018). 
40 I dare say that if an indigenous individual from the North Sentinel Island of 
India came across any denomination of U.S.D., he or she would have absolutely 
no use or interest—and thus no value—in the piece of paper.  
41 See supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text. 
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II. CURRENT REGULATORY SCHEME AND PROPOSED MODEL 
FRAMEWORKS 
A. Why Regulate Cryptocurrency? 
As discussed, cryptocurrencies are a unique instrument, and the 
underlying technology has great potential utility. Purchasing and using the 
instruments themselves is risky, and their pseudonymous nature may serve 
and often have served as a vehicle for illegal or unscrupulous activity.42 
Moreover, the lack of an issuing entity or individual to hold accountable43 
and the decentralized, nearly-instantaneous transferability of these 
instruments create significant roadblocks to direct regulation (such as 
federal securities laws regulate the “issuers” of securities). As the 
remainder of this paper will explain, regulation of the transaction 
intermediaries (cryptocurrency trading venues/exchanges) would likely be 
the most feasible, and most effective, means of regulation.  
While cryptocurrencies can be transferred peer-to-peer (without 
an intermediary), most cryptocurrency trading is conducted using 
cryptocurrency trading venues (“exchanges”).44 The mainstream 
cryptocurrency market space is dominated by centralized exchanges 
facilitating inter-user transactions between cryptocurrencies, from fiat 
currencies (such as the U.S.D. and Euro) to cryptocurrencies, and vice 
versa.45  
A centralized cryptocurrency exchange acts as a third-party 
intermediary to facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers.46 
Utilizing a third-party provides many advantages to users. These 
intermediaries undertake a search function to locate another party from the 
                                                      
42 See supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text. 
43 See Memorandum 1037, supra note 1 at 3 (“There is no entity that must honor 
the value of a cryptocurrency, or exchange any given unit of a cryptocurrency for 
sovereign currency.”). 
44 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
45 See Nathan Reiff, What Are Centralized Cryptocurrency Exchanges?, 
INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/-/what-are-
centralized-cryptocurrency-exchanges/ (overview of form and function of 
centralized cryptocurrency exchanges); see also Loi Luu, Solving the Liquidity 
Challenge of Decentralized Exchanges, COINDESK (Aug. 13, 2017), 
https://www.coindesk.com/solving-liquidity-challenge-decentralized-exchanges/ 
(same). The price for cryptocurrencies is set by “spot” trading platforms—i.e., 
what the market is willing to pay. Clayton & Giancarlo, supra note 12. 
46 Reiff, supra note 45. 
 
81                        DEFINING AND REGULATING  [Vol. 17        
CRYPTOCURRENCY 
exchange’s user network.47 The intermediary then matches buyers and 
sellers, safely completing the transaction on the users’ behalf (whether 
executing the buy-sell transaction, or providing instant liquidity if an 
appropriate match is not found).48 Because cryptocurrencies are often 
stored in digital wallets accessible only through long alphanumeric public 
and private keychains, the entirety of the wallet’s contents are lost forever 
if an individual forgets or loses his or her wallet key.49 Thus, users may 
find it advantageous to transfer their cryptocurrency assets to a centralized 
exchange, allowing the business to safeguard (take custody of) the coins.50  
While using cryptocurrency exchanges can be beneficial to users, 
the presence of an intermediary in the transaction chain increases exposure 
to potential risks and vulnerabilities. For example, hackers frequently 
exploit weaknesses in the cybersecurity of centralized exchanges. On 
several occasions, criminals have successfully stolen tens of millions of 
dollars’ worth of cryptocurrency which was never recovered.51 This is 
                                                      
47 Reiff, supra note 45; see also Hans R. Stoll, Electronic Trading in Stock 
Markets, 20 J. ECON. PERSP. 153, 154 (2006) (discussing the need for market’s 
capacity both to search and match buyers and sellers).  
48 See Stoll, supra note 47, at 154 (“[M]arkets must have the facility to search for 
the other side of trades and to provide liquidity should the other side not be 
available.”).  
49 See Reiff, supra note 45 (“[A]n individual can lose hundreds or thousands of 
dollars in digital currency holdings simply by forgetting the key to a wallet.”); see 
also Louise Matsakis, How Wired Lost $100,000 in Bitcoin, WIRED (May 28, 
2018), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-lostbitcoin/?mbid=nl_052818_daily 
_list_p. 
50 Centralized exchanges such as Coinbase act as custodial services, holding users’ 
funds and promising to protect the digital assets, allowing wallet access through 
a username and password. See, e.g., Digital Asset Custody For Institutions, 
COINBASE, https://custody.coinbase.com (last visited Dec. 5, 2018). 
Decentralized cryptocurrency exchanges also exist. See Luu, supra note 45. 
Unlike their centralized counterparts, decentralized exchanges do not function as 
digital asset custodians; instead, customer funds are held by each individual user 
in a personal wallet. Id. This function is touted as allowing users greater autonomy 
and privacy. See id. However, decentralized platforms have yet to attract a 
mainstream user base. Id. 
51 See, e.g., Darryn Pollock, The Mess That Was Mt. Gox: Four Years On, 
COINTELEGRAPH (Mar. 9, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/the-mess-that-
was-mt-gox-four-years-on (discussing 2014 hack of Mt. Gox—at the time the 
largest cryptocurrency exchange—where 750,000 user Bitcoins and 100,000 of 
the exchange’s own coins were stolen); see also Stan Higgins, The Bitfinex Bitcoin 
Hack: What We Know (And Don't Know), COINDESK, 
https://www.coindesk.com/bitfinex-bitcoin-hack-know-dont-know/ (last updated 
Jun. 20, 2018) (detailing theft of more than $60 million U.S.D. from one of the 
largest cryptocurrency exchanges, BitFinex. At the time, the hack was “the largest 
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especially concerning in custodial arrangements where the platform holds 
and promises to protect users’ funds. Therefore, it is imperative that 
exchanges are subject to regulations establishing sufficient cybersecurity 
protocols.  
Section II(B) will address the current scheme and desirability of 
regulating cryptocurrency exchange intermediaries as money transmitters. 
B. Regulation of Cryptocurrency Exchanges and the Applicability 
of Existing Money Transmission Laws. 
State and federal money transmission statutes govern the transfer 
of money or value from one party to another. The individual states have 
the authority to administer and license money transmitters through their 
respective Blue Sky Laws.52 Additionally, “money transmitting 
businesses” must register with the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.53 Money 
transmitters are a subset of the Money Service Business (MSB) category, 
and must comply with FinCEN requirements relating to Bank Secrecy Act 
(BSA)54 laws, including AML measures and Know Your Customer (KYC) 
rules.55 
Currently, many cryptocurrency exchanges are opting for 
classification as money transmitters, which are primarily regulated under 
                                                      
loss of bitcoins by an exchange since Japan's infamous Mt. Gox[.]”). 
Cryptocurrency businesses also face the risk of insider trading and fund 
mismanagement. Rialto.AI, How much do we really know about insider trading 
in crypto?, MEDIUM,  https://medium.com/@RialtoAI/how-much-we-really-
know-about-insider-trading-in-crypto-81911018c9e2 (July 13, 2018). 
52 Federal law proscribes operating an “unlicensed money transmitting business.” 
18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2018). This term is explicitly defined as “affect[ing] interstate 
or foreign commerce . . .” and either (A) operating without a license in a state 
criminalizing unlicensed operation, (B) failing to comply with federal registration 
requirements of 31 U.S.C. §5330, or (C) transmitting funds known to have been 
derived from or intended to be used in criminal or unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. § 
1960(b)(1). There is no federal money transmission licensing scheme. 
53 31 U.S.C. § 5330 (West 2018). “Money transmitting business” and “money 
transmitting service” are defined in §§ 5330(d)(1) and (2), respectively. Id. 
54 The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), also known as the Currency and Foreign 
Transactions Reporting Act, requires that financial institutions in the U.S. assist 
U.S. government agencies in detecting and preventing money laundering and 
fraud. The Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5332 (2018).  
55 FinCEN retains authority to administer the BSA. See Treas. Order 180-01 (July 
1, 2014), available at https://www.treasury.gov/about/role-of-treasury/orders-
directives/Pages/to180-01.aspx. 
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individual state Blue Sky laws.56 Some exchanges report to FinCEN.57 At 
first, the jurisdictional basis for such regulatory authority might appear 
tenuous; after all, Part II(A) discussed how cryptocurrencies do not fit 
within certain legal definitions of “currency” or “money.” But, a 2013 
FinCEN guidance clarified that certain cryptocurrency-related activities 
fall within its regulatory purview under the BSA.58 Thus, absent 
Congressional legislation or state statutes specifically applicable to 
cryptocurrencies, money transmission seems to be the default regulatory 
framework. 
Money transmission statutes, however, were not designed to 
regulate cryptocurrency businesses.59 Presently, interstate classification of 
cryptocurrencies and regulation of cryptocurrency markets and exchanges 
varies significantly. Most states have yet to consider cryptocurrency-
specific legislation.60 As a result, cryptocurrency-related businesses are 
faced with an uncertain regulatory landscape. The effective or proposed 
regulatory treatment of cryptocurrency businesses in three states with 
active securities markets, financial sectors, and technology industries—
New York, California, and Texas—will be discussed in turn below. 
 
                                                      
56 Cf. Clayton & Giancarlo, supra note 12 (“Many . . . cryptocurrency-trading 
platforms have registered as payment services and are not subject to direct 
oversight by the SEC or the CFTC”); see also Virtual Currencies: The Oversight 
Role of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the U.S. Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission: Hearings Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, 115th Cong. 1 (2018) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Jay 
Clayton, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n), available at 
https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/ 
doc/Clayton%20Testimony%202-6-18.pdf (claiming current regulatory 
framework applicable to cryptocurrency exchanges “was not designed with 
trading of the type we are witnessing in mind.”). Coinbase, Inc.—the parent 
company behind cryptocurrency exchanges Coinbase and Global Digital Asset 
Exchange (GDAX) in the United States—maintains it “is licensed to engage in 
money transmission in most U.S. jurisdictions” and is registered with FinCEN as 
a Money Services Business. Is Coinbase regulated?, COINBASE, 
https://support.coinbase.com/customer/en/portal/articles/2689172-is-coinbase-
regulated-?b_id=13521 (last visited Dec. 5, 2018).   
57 See, e.g., Is Coinbase Regulated?, supra note 56.  
58 FinCEN Guidance, supra note 21. 
59 See Douglas, supra note 29, at 47 (“[M]any of the money transmitter statutes 
neither squarely cover digital currencies nor provide the degree of regulatory 
oversight desired.”); see also Hearings, supra note 56 (questioning desirability of 
current regulatory scheme). 
60 See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 29, at 44–45 (outlining the “different [states’] 
approaches on the regulation of digital currency”). 
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1. New York  
In 2014, New York became the first state to adopt a 
cryptocurrency-specific licensing regime: the “BitLicense.”61 As of 
August 8, 2015, businesses that deal with any form of digital currency are 
required to apply for a license from the New York Department of Financial 
Services (NYDFS), pay a nonrefundable application fee of $5,000,62 
consent to state examination, post a surety bond in an amount determined 
on a case-by-case basis,63 provide various disclosures and financial 
information,64 and establish AML,65 cybersecurity,66 and business 
continuity and disaster recovery programs.67 The strict and expensive 
BitLicense led to a massive public outcry from the cryptocurrency 
community and a swift departure of Bitcoin-related businesses from the 
state.68 Though several cryptocurrency businesses have applied, NYDFS 
has awarded only nine BitLicenses to date.69 
                                                      
61 Stan Higgins, NY Bitcoin Businesses Now Have 45 Days to Apply for 
BitLicense, COINDESK, https://www.coindesk.com/ny-bitcoin-business-45-days-
bitlicense/ (last updated Oct. 23, 2015); see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. 
tit. 23, § 200.3 (stating a license is required to engage in any “Virtual Currency 
Business Activity.”). 
62 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.5. 
63 Id. at § 200.9. 
64 Id. at § 200.14. 
65 Id. at § 200.15. 
66 Id. at § 200.16. 
67 Id. at § 200.17.  
68 Many Bitcoin companies have said the BitLicense application process is 
expensive and difficult; one week after the BitLicense’s effective date, Bitstamp 
had spent roughly $100,000 in time allocation and legal and compliance fees. 
Daniel Roberts, Behind the "exodus" of bitcoin startups from New York, FORTUNE 
(Aug. 14, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/08/14/bitcoin-startups-leave-new-york-
bitlicense/. For a nonpartisan reaction, see Martin Tillier, What BitLicense 
Regulations Mean for Bitcoin, NASDAQ (June 10, 2015), 
https://www.nasdaq.com/article/what-bitlicense-regulations-mean-for-bitcoin-
cm485273 (acknowledging valid overreach concerns but ultimately concluding 
the BitLicense is “the first, if somewhat wobbly, step toward” Bitcoin gaining 
widespread acceptance). 
69 Coinbase was granted a BitLicense in 2017. See Michael del Castillo, Bitcoin 
Exchange Coinbase Receives New York BitLicense, COINDESK, 
https://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-exchange-coinbase-receives-bitlicense/ (last 
updated Jan. 18, 2017). A (quite short) list of institutions with a BitLicense can 
be found by searching “Type of Institution: Virtual Currency” on the NYDFS 
website. See Who We Supervise, Department of Financial Services, 
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2. California 
California has considered two BitLicense-type proposals, though 
neither has been successful. The California Department of Business 
Oversight (CDBO) licenses and regulates money transmitters.70 In 
February 2015, a California assemblyman introduced Assembly Bill 
(A.B.) 1326 as a proposal to regulate virtual currency in the state.71 A few 
months later, the bill was ordered “inactive” and set aside.72 
Critics voiced concerns about A.B. 1326’s vague definitions and 
unclear data collection practices, believing this threatened the future of 
virtual currency innovation in California.73 In particular, opponents feared 
an overly broad definition of “virtual currency business” might subject 
unsuspecting product developers and individuals transacting on a small 
scale or personal basis to the onerous licensing requirements.74  
Two years later, the same lawmaker introduced A.B. 1123, 
another (ultimately unsuccessful) bid to regulate virtual currency in the 
state.75 Despite failing in the Assembly, A.B. 1123 offers insight into 
California’s approach to the process to cryptocurrency regulation. For 
example, the bill would have required any person or entity involved in a 
                                                      
https://myportal.dfs.ny.gov/web/guest-applications/ 
who-we-supervise (last visited Dec. 5, 2018). 
70 In California, the act of “money transmission” encompasses the following: “(1) 
Selling or issuing payment instruments,” “(2) Selling or issuing stored value,” or 
“(3) Receiving money for transmission.” CAL. FIN. CODE § 2003(q) (West 2018). 
In May 2015, the CDBO stated it was “still assessing the extent to which, if at all, 
we want to regulate virtual currencies under existing California law.” See Tanaya 
Macheel, California Leaks, Retracts Bitcoin-Friendly Statement, AMERICAN 
BANKER (May 22, 2015), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/california-
leaks-retracts-bitcoin-friendly-statement (retraction of CDBO statement which 
indicated agency’s decision to defer digital currency regulation to the legislature). 
71 See Yessi Bello Perez, California’s Bitcoin Bill Shelved by State Senator, 
COINDESK (last updated Sept. 17, 2015), https://www.coindesk.com/californias-
bitcoin-bill-shelved-by-state-senator/. 
72 Id. 
73 See Rainey Reitman, A License to Kill Innovation: Why A.B. 1326—
California’s Bitcoin License—is Bad for Business, Innovation, and Privacy, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.eff.org/ 
deeplinks/2015/08/license-kill-innovation-why-ab-1326-californias-bitcoin-
license-bad-business (criticism of A.B. 1326). 
74 Id.  
75 Assem. Bill 1123, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017), available at 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180A
B1123. 
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“virtual currency business”76 in California to register with California’s 
Commissioner of Business Oversight and obtain a license.  
Interestingly, many of the virtual currency business license 
application requirements proposed in A.B. 1123 mirrored those required 
of California Money Transmitter license applicants.77 To obtain a license 
under A.B. 1123, applicants would be required to pay a nonrefundable 
$5,000 application fee, $2,500 annual renewal fee and $125 annual fee for 
each “license branch office,” maintain a bond or trust account in U.S.D. in 
an amount specified by the Commissioner, submit certain ownership and 
capital-related information, agree to annual audits, and periodically 
provide balance sheets, income statements, and other verification forms.78 
The Commissioner would also determine the minimal amount of capital 
deemed sufficient for the “safety and soundness” of the applicant and 
maintenance of consumer protection.79  
While A.B. 1123 appeared to strike a compromise between 
allowing innovation and protecting consumers, many argued A.B. 1123 
overreached.80 However, some welcomed the potential regulatory 
clarity.81  
California’s proposals have been analogized to New York’s 
BitLicense regime.82 Pawel Kuskowski, CEO and co-founder of 
                                                      
76 The proposal defined “‘[v]irtual currency business’ [as] maintaining full 
custody or control of virtual currency in [California] on behalf of others.” Id. at 
§ 26000(c). “Virtual currency” was defined as “any type of digital unit that is used 
as a medium of exchange or a form of digitally stored value.” It excluded digital 
units with sole use in online gaming platforms or as part of merchant rewards 
programs and that are redeemable for goods and services with merchants “but 
cannot be converted into, or redeemed for, fiat currency.” Id. at § 26000(b)(1)–
(2). 
77 See generally CAL. FIN. CODE § 2032 (West 2018). 
78 See Assem. Bill 1123 § 26006 (setting forth license application requirements). 
79 Id. at § 26008.  
80 See, e.g., Jamie Redman, Bitcoin Advocates Prepare to Fight the California 
Bitlicense, BITCOIN (May 4, 2017), https://news.bitcoin.com/bitcoin-advocates-
fight-california-bitlicense/ (highlighting the fact that applicants could be “rejected 
for any reason, with no administrative appeal” as a primary objection by those 
who opposed the bill). 
81 See, e.g., Peter Van Valkenburgh, California is back at it; a new (old) virtual 
currency licensing bill is pending in the Assembly, COINCENTER (April 12, 2017), 
https://coincenter.org/link/california-is-back-at-it-a-new-old-virtual-currency-
licensing-bill-is-pending-in-the-assembly (acknowledging A.B. 1123 was an 
improvement from A.B. 1326, and “would remove some of that dangerous 
uncertainty in California[,]” but advocating for adoption of the URVCBA). 
82 See Michael Scott, How Five States Are Approaching Bitcoin Regulation, 
BITCOIN MAGAZINE (May 16, 2017), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/how-five-
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Coinfirm,83 believes A.B. 1123 strongly resembled New York’s 
BitLicense.84 Because California occupies a “unique position as the 
technology innovation and startup capital of the world,” he worries a 
California BitLicense scheme will “have an even more catastrophic effect 
than the [New York] version.”85 While larger, more established companies 
could weather the cost of applying for another money transmission or 
BitLicense, the high costs could stifle startups and lead to a mass exodus 
of many cryptocurrency firms from California as it did in New York.  
3. Texas 
 In lieu of a BitLicense-type regime, Texas regulators opted for a 
synthesized approach. In 2014, the Texas Department of Banking issued 
Supervisory Memorandum 1037 clarifying “the regulatory treatment of 
[cryptocurrencies] under [the state’s] existing statutory definitions.”86 
Regulators concluded that although “[e]xchanging [cryptocurrency] for 
sovereign currency is not currency exchange under the Texas Finance 
Code,”87 such a cryptocurrency transaction involving sovereign currency 
“may be money transmission depending on how the sovereign currency is 
handled.”88     
Regulators provided examples of common cryptocurrency 
transactions and guidance on appropriate regulatory treatment. For 
example, the “[e]xchange of cryptocurrency for sovereign currency 
between two parties is not money transmission,”89 nor is the “[e]xchange 
of one cryptocurrency for another cryptocurrency,”90 or the “[t]ransfer of 
cryptocurrency by itself.”91 However, the “[e]xchange of cryptocurrency 
                                                      
states-are-approaching-bitcoin-regulation-cm790123 (referring to A.B. 1123 as 
“a version of New York’s infamous BitLicense.”); see also Redman, supra note 
80. 
83 Coinfirm is a blockchain AML risk and compliance platform. For a description 
of Coinfirm’s business, see COINFIRM BLOCKCHAIN TRANSACTIONS, 
https://www.coinfirm.io (last visited Dec. 5, 2018). 
84 See Scott, supra note 82 (quoting Kuskowski). 
85 Scott, supra note 82. 
86 Memorandum 1037, supra note 1 at 1. 
87 Memorandum 1037, supra note 1 at 2 (citing TEX. FIN. CODE § 151.501(b)(1)). 
88 Memorandum 1037, supra note 1 at 3.  
89 Memorandum 1037, supra note 1 at 3–4 (classifying such transaction as 
“essentially a sale of goods between two parties.”). 
90 Memorandum 1037, supra note 1 at 4 (the transaction involves “no receipt of 
money, and therefore no money transmission occurs.”). 
91 Memorandum 1037, supra note 1 at 4 (reiterating cryptocurrency is “not money 
or monetary value” thus “the receipt of it in exchange for a promise to make it 
available at a later time or different location is not money transmission. This 
includes intermediaries who receive cryptocurrency for transfer to a third party, 
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for sovereign currency through a third party exchanger is generally money 
transmission,”92 and a cryptocurrency-sovereign currency exchange 
“through an automated machine [such as a “Bitcoin ATM”] is usually but 
not always money transmission.”93 
A cryptocurrency business involved in money transmission in 
Texas is required to comply with applicable statutory licensing provisions 
that include a $10,000 nonrefundable application fee, minimum $300,000 
surety bond (up to $2,000,000), and financial statements.94 Three 
additional considerations apply to virtual currency transactions conducted 
online: (1) licensees must have a minimum net worth of $500,000, which 
may be increased to $1,000,000 at the Commissioner’s discretion,95 (2) 
licensees cannot include virtual currency assets as permissible 
investments,96 and (3) licensees must submit a current third-party 
cybersecurity audit of computer systems used in the virtual currency 
business.97  
As shown above, securing a money transmission license from just 
one state is a complicated and uncertain process. Consequently, 
cryptocurrency businesses seeking licensure in multiple states are faced 
with exponential time and monetary expenditures. If states wish to retain 
jurisdiction over cryptocurrency exchanges, they must act quickly to 
clarify and coordinate applicable regulation. 
                                                      
and entities who, akin to depositories, hold cryptocurrency on behalf of 
customers.”). 
92 Memorandum 1037, supra note 1 at 4 (“most Bitcoin exchange sites, such as 
the failed Mt. Gox, facilitate exchanges by acting as an escrow-like intermediary 
. . . [i]rrespective of its handling of the cryptocurrency, the exchanger conducts 
money transmission by receiving the buyer's sovereign currency in exchange for 
a promise to make it available to the seller.”). 
93 Memorandum 1037, supra note 1 at 4 (“[i]f the machine never involves a third 
party, and only facilitates a sale or purchase of Bitcoins by the machine's operator 
directly with the customer, there is no money transmission.”). 
94 Licensing provisions are found in TEX. FIN. CODE §151. The Texas Department 
of Banking also provides a table outlining general application requirements for 
MSBs, available at http://www.dob.texas.gov/applications-forms-publications/ 
general-application-requirements (last updated Sept. 2017). 
95 TEX. FIN. CODE § 151.307 (West 2017). Texas DOB’s policy is that license 
holders operating through the internet meet the five-location threshold for 
§ 151.307(a)’s net worth requirement. The commissioner may increase the net 
worth requirement up to $1,000,000 maximum. Id. at § 151.307(b). See also 
Memorandum 1037, supra note 1 at 4.  
96 TEX. FIN. CODE § 151.309. 
97 TEX. FIN. CODE § 151.203(a)(3). 
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C. Endeavors to Improve and Streamline the Current Regulatory 
Framework  
Because cryptocurrency businesses must obtain licenses from 
each state of operation,98 they are subject to both cumulative 
licensing/application fees and high compliance costs of ongoing reporting 
and disclosure obligations to retain their licenses.99 Cryptocurrency 
businesses are not the only ones affected by inconsistent state regulation. 
Federal regulators worry the “patchwork of state [money transmitter] 
regulation” applicable to cryptocurrency exchanges creates obstacles to 
transparency and consumer protection.100  
This section examines current proposals for interstate reciprocity 
and uniformity for cryptocurrency business regulation. These proposals 
aim to clarify Blue Sky legislative scope, increase transparency, and 
reduce compliance costs for covered businesses.  
1. The CSBS’s Efforts at Uniformity and Reciprocity 
In September 2015, the Counsel of State Bank Supervisors 
(CSBS) released its Model Regulatory Framework for State Regulation of 
Certain Virtual Currency Activities (“Model Framework” or “CSBS 
Framework”).101 The Model Framework suggests states regulate 
                                                      
98 Assuming the state has enacted an applicable money transmission statute. 
99 See discussion supra note 68; see also Douglas, supra note 29 at 45–46 
(discussing sizable “time and cost component” to complying with varied (and 
sometimes conflicting) state money transmission laws); David Floyd, Can the 
SEC Regulate Bitcoin? Cryptoassets' Legal Questions (Tentatively) Answered, 
NASDAQ (Dec. 15, 2017) https://www.nasdaq.com/article/can-the-sec-regulate-
bitcoin-cryptoassets-legal-questions-tentatively-answered-cm892254 (Matthew 
Gertler, senior analyst and counsel at Digital Asset Research, says the process of 
obtaining a money transmission license “can take over a year and cost half a 
million dollars.”).  
100 Roger Aitken, U.S. CFTC Commissioner Says Cryptocurrency Exchanges 
Adopting 'Self-Regulation' Could Spur Standards, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2018/02/15/u-s-cftc-commissioner-
says-cryptocurrency-exchanges-adopting-self-regulation-could-spur-
standards/#f631c6145e12 (quoting CFTC commissioner Brian Quintenz, who 
views the current regulatory scheme of cryptocurrencies as a “patchwork 
regulatory framework” of state and federal jurisdictions); see also Clayton and 
Giancarlo, supra note 12.  
101 CSBS, STATE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR VIRTUAL CURRENCY 
ACTIVITIES: CSBS MODEL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK (Sept. 15, 2015), 
https://www.csbs.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/CSBS-Model-Regulatory-
Framework%28September%2015%202015%29.pdf [hereinafter “Model 
Framework” or “CSBS Framework”]. 
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cryptocurrency businesses as they regulate fiat money transmission and 
exchanges.102  
First, the CSBS encourages states to update their existing 
“currency” or “money” definitions “to clarify the scope of their statutes 
and promote consistency over state lines.”103 The organization defines 
“virtual currency”104 as “a digital representation of value used as a medium 
of exchange, a unit of account, or a store of value, but does not have legal 
tender status as recognized by the United States Government.”105 The 
organization recommends state licensure and supervision over “entities 
performing activities involving third party control of virtual currency” and 
activities involving virtual currency which would be subject to state laws 
when involving fiat currency.106 
To accomplish this objective, the Framework proposes several 
statutory guidelines. For example, it suggests cryptocurrency businesses 
submit business plans and disclosures as a licensure prerequisite.107 It also 
allows flexibility in source of capital or bond reserves.108 It further requires 
“clear consumer disclosures and notice of risks,”109 BSA/AML 
compliance,110 and periodic reporting requirements.111 The Framework 
does not mandate a cybersecurity audit112 or the education and training of 
regulators.113   
                                                      
102 See Model Framework, supra note 101 at 3 n.7. The CSBS Model Framework 
has been equated to the New York BitLicense. Douglas, supra note 29 at 48 
(CSBS Framework “largely mirrors the New York [BitLicense].”).  
103 Model Framework, supra note 101 at 2. 
104 As used in the Model Framework, “virtual currency” includes “digital 
currency” and “cryptocurrency.” Model Framework, supra note 101 at 11. 
105 Model Framework, supra note 101 at 2. The definition excludes “the software 
[and] protocols governing the transfer of the digital representation of value” and 
“stored value redeemable exclusively in goods or services limited to transactions 
involving a defined merchant, such as rewards programs.” Model Framework, 
supra note 101 at 2.  
106 Model Framework, supra note 101 at 2–3.  
107 Model Framework, supra note 101 at 3.  
108 See Model Framework, supra note 101 at 5 (States can determine acceptable 
amount of “[p]ermissible investment reserves in the form of cash, virtual 
currency, or high- quality, highly liquid, investment-grade assets.”). 
109 Model Framework, supra note 101 at 6 (internal quotations omitted). 
110 Model Framework, supra note 101 at 7. 
111 Model Framework, supra note 101 at 7. 
112 Model Framework, supra note 101 at 6 (suggesting an audit “should be 
performed where necessary” contingent on the company’s risk profile). 
113 See Model Framework, supra note 101 at 9 (acknowledging “understanding 
how a cryptocurrency is managed, created, and valued will facilitate appropriate 
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While the Framework is a productive first step in clarifying 
regulatory ambiguity surrounding cryptocurrency businesses, it notably 
“does not include an ‘on ramp,’ temporary or conditional license” for 
startup companies with “low volumes and/or limited business 
activities.”114 Moreover, it does not explicitly address reciprocal licensure. 
On February 6, 2018, the CSBS announced that seven states had 
agreed to a multi-state compact (“Compact”) that standardizes the 
licensing process for Fintech firms and non-bank companies subject to 
blue sky money transmission laws.115 The Compact is part of the CSBS 
“Vision 2020” plan for Fintech Regulation.116 Under this agreement, if any 
participatory state reviews the “key elements of state licensing” for a 
single licensed money transmitter through its initial licensing process, the 
other participating states agree to accept the findings.117 While Vision 
2020 may signal a shift toward a reciprocal 50-state licensing scheme, 
unless individual states update their money transmission statutes to 
include jurisdiction over cryptocurrency businesses, regulatory ambiguity 
remains. The following subsection explores another potential regulatory 
scheme that builds upon both the CSBS Framework and existing MTS 
laws. 
2. The URVCBA: A Comprehensive Solution? 
In 2017, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws (also known as the Uniform Law Commission, or “ULC”) 
proposed its own regulatory solution: the Uniform Regulation of Virtual-
Currency Business Act (“URVCBA”).118 In contrast to the CSBS 
Framework’s suggestive guidelines, the URVCBA is a substantive model 
                                                      
regulation and supervision of companies utilizing virtual currencies,” but 
nonetheless excluding such guidance from the Framework).  
114 Model Framework, supra note 101 at 3 (“consumers can be harmed by entities 
regardless of size”). 
115 The states currently participating in the Compact are Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, Tennessee, Texas and Washington. See CSBS, State Regulators 
Take First Step to Standardize Licensing Practices for Fintech Payments (Feb. 6, 
2018), https://www.csbs.org/state-regulators-take-first-step-standardize-
licensing-practices-fintech-payments. The CSBS announcement also stated that 
“[o]ther states are expected to join this compact.” 
116 Id. See also CSBS, Vision 2020 for Fintech and Non-Bank Regulation (Jun. 7, 
2018), https://www.csbs.org/vision2020 [hereinafter “Vision 2020”]. 
117 CSBS, Vision 2020, supra note 116. 
118 URVCBA, supra note 17; see also Peter Van Valkenburgh, The Uniform Law 
Commission Has Given States a Clear Path to Approach Bitcoin, COINDESK (July 
27, 2017), https://www.coindesk.com/uniform-law-commission-given-states-
clear-path-approach-bitcoin/ (praising the definitional clarity and regulatory 
transparency of the URVCBA). 
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statute. In drafting the URVCBA, the ULC solicited comments and input 
from various federal and state regulatory agencies, attorneys, and industry 
organizations across the spectrum. These included the U.S Department of 
the Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Conference of 
State Bank Supervisors (CSBS), the Texas Department of Banking, the 
California Department of Business Oversight, the Electronic Freedom 
Frontier, Coinbase, Inc., the Bitcoin Foundation, and PayPal.119  
The ULC was significantly influenced by the CSBS efforts120 and 
existing state money transmission statutes.121 The diversity of views 
reflected in the URVCBA results in a balanced regulatory scheme 
sufficiently tailored to the unique characteristics and innovative capability 
of cryptocurrencies. The URVCBA reflects the ULC’s goal of reducing 
information costs to individuals and businesses transacting in different 
states.122 Notably, cryptocurrency proponents are more amenable to the 
URVCBA than to other regulatory schemes or proposals.123 
 Key features that distinguish the URVCBA from many Blue Sky 
“money services” or “money transmitter” statutes include (1) a focus on 
interstate “reciprocal licensure,” (2) more flexible net worth and reserve 
requirements, (3) a three-tier system to determine full licensure, 
intermediate or “on-ramp” registration, or complete exemption from the 
act, and (4) requirements that particular cryptocurrency businesses—those 
with “control” or custody over cryptocurrency belonging to users—satisfy 
aggregate entitlements and favor the interests of persons placing virtual 
currency under the control of a licensee or registrant over the interests of 
                                                      
119 URVCBA, supra note 17, at 11–12.  
120 See Douglas, supra note 29, at 48 n. 169 (discussing drafting process of then-
in-progress URVCBA). 
121 See URVCBA, supra note 17, § 103 cmt. 1 at 28. The ULC recognizes that the 
appropriate regulatory framework focuses on “persons that issue virtual 
currencies or that provide services that allow others to transfer virtual currencies, 
provide ‘virtual-currency’ exchange services to the public, or offer to take custody 
of virtual currency for other persons.” The URVCBA “is intended to govern 
persons that hold themselves out as providing services to owners of virtual 
currency comparable to service that would be deemed ‘money transmission’ 
under the Uniform Money Services Act or other state ‘money transmission’ 
statute.” URVCBA, supra note 17, § 103 cmt. 1 at 28. 
122 See URVCBA, supra note 17, at 1 (“Clarity about which regulatory regime 
will govern virtual-currency business activity will assist virtual-currency 
businesses in many states and the greater legitimacy that uniform acts can bring 
to industry sectors will enhance the ability of these types of businesses to attract 
investment and customers.”). 
123 See Van Valkenburgh, supra note 118 (explaining how the URVCBA is 
superior to New York’s BitLicense and California’s vague current money 
transmission laws). 
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creditors of the licensee or registrant.124 These provisions will be discussed 
below. 
 The URVCBA defines “virtual currency”125 as “a digital 
representation of value that: (i) is used as a medium of exchange, unit of 
account, or store of value; and (ii) is not legal tender, whether or not 
denominated in legal tender . . . .”126 The jurisdictional scope focuses on 
intermediaries functioning analogously to traditional money 
transmitters127 and custodianships.128 Transactions covered by the act 
“must involve ‘virtual currency’ and ‘virtual-currency business activity,’ 
[as] defined in Section 102(25), a definition that relies on active verbs – 
control, exchange, store, and transfer.”129 Covered activity must be 
“performed with or on behalf of residents of the jurisdiction that seeks to 
license the provision of such activities in a jurisdiction in the United 
States.”130 The URVCBA’s definition of virtual currency, and its 
recommendation of a framework analogous to state-overseen money 
transmission and exchange regulation, comports with the CSBS Model 
Framework.131  
Like existing money transmission statutes132 and the CSBS 
Framework,133 the URVCBA proposes a state-administered licensing 
                                                      
124 PREFATORY NOTE: PURPOSE OF THE ACT, URVCBA, supra note 17, at 11–12. 
The ULC plans to develop a substitute for URVCBA § 502 that “adopts UCC 
Article 8’s more balanced approach to this matter,” and submit it for enactment 
in 2018. Id. at 2. Therefore, feature (4) is not discussed at length. 
125 See supra note 1 (the term “virtual currency” encompasses “cryptocurrency” 
as used in this paper). 
126 URVCBA, supra note 17, § 102(23), at 17. Similar to the definition proposed 
by the CSBS, see supra note 101, the definition in the URVCBA excludes the 
digital representation of value granted in rewards programs (without the ability to 
exchange for legal tender) or used solely in gaming. URVCBA, supra note 17, § 
102(23)(B)(i) – (ii), at 17.  
127 See discussion supra note 121; see also URVCBA, supra note 17, § 102 cmt. 
2 at 21. 
128 See URVCBA, supra note 17, § 102 cmt. 2 at 21 (activities comparable to 
“custodianships similar in nature to a securities entitlement subject to Article 8 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code”). 
129 See URVCBA, supra note 17, at 4 (“To be covered by this act, the transaction 
must involve ‘virtual currency’ and ‘virtual- currency business activity,’ which is 
defined in Section 102(25), a definition that relies on active verbs – control, 
exchange, store, and transfer.”). 
130 URVCBA, supra note 17, § 102 cmt. 2 at 21. 
131 See discussion supra notes 101–106. 
132 See discussion on California and Texas money transmission statutes supra Part 
II(B). 
133 CSBS Framework, supra note 101, at 2–3.  
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scheme.134 Unlike the former two, however, the URVCBA permits an 
individual or business licensed in another state to file for a reciprocal 
license under Alternative A, or conduct business with in-state residents 
after following the substantial notice and certification requirements in 
Alternative B.135 License applicants must also satisfy security, net worth, 
and reserve requirements set by state regulators in order to meet 
reasonably foreseeable liquidity demand.136 The URVCBA recognizes that 
due to the immaturity of the market, surety bonds and letters of credit are 
not readily available to cryptocurrency start-ups.137 Thus, it cautions 
against using surety bonds and letters of credit as an exclusive means of 
ensuring security. In addition to these traditional methods, the URVCBA 
suggests states consider funds, investment property, or other security from 
applicants to satisfy financial asset requirements.138  
The URVCBA compels license issuance “[a]bsent good cause . . . 
if the applicant complies with this [article] and pays the costs of the 
investigation under Section 202(g) and the initial licensee fee under 
Section 202(a)(3).”139 The model act also permits a reasonable 30-day 
appeals process for application denials.140 This addresses a significant 
criticism of both the New York and proposed California BitLicenses: lack 
of adequate appellate procedures.141 
The URVCBA also proposes three tiers of classification for 
cryptocurrency businesses. Each tier imposes obligations proportionate to 
                                                      
134 URVCBA, supra note 17, §§ 202–203. 
135 URVCBA, supra note 17, § 203; but cf. supra notes 115–116 (CSBS’s multi-
state Compact and “Vision 2020” also contemplate MSB licensing reciprocity, 
albeit through a different process). 
136 URVCBA, supra note 17, § 204.  
137 URVCBA, supra note 17, § 204. 
138 URVCBA, supra note 17, § 204 cmts. 1–3. 
139 URVCBA, supra note 17, § 205(a). 
140 URVCBA, supra note 17, § 205(b). 
141 See, e.g. Redman, supra note 80 (discussing how critics of California’s A.B. 
1123 were displeased that “[l]icense applications [could] be rejected for any 
reason, with no administrative appeal” under the proposed legislation.); Letter 
from Marcia Hofmann, EFF Special Counsel and Attorney at Law, to the New 
York State Department of Financial Services, Comments to the New York State 
Department of Financial Services on BitLicense: The Proposed Virtual Currency 
Regulatory Framework, on behalf of Electronic Frontier Foundation, Internet 
Archive, and reddit (Oct. 21, 2014),   
https://www.eff.org/files/2014/10/21/bitlicense-comments-eff-ia-reddit-
hofmann-cover.pdf (“The proposal does not even set out a process for an applicant 
to appeal the denial of a license. Regardless, even if there were such a procedure, 
[New York judicial precedent] puts the burden on the censor to seek judicial 
review of its decision, not the applicant.”). 
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the business’s monetary aggregate annual activity volume with residents 
of an enacting state. Individuals and business entities that do not exceed a 
$5,000 annual activity volume are fully exempt from the Act.142 Unlike the 
CSBS Framework, the URVCBA also provides for an “on-ramp” to full 
licensure: those with annual activity volume that exceeds $5,000 but is less 
than $35,000 are classified as “registrants.”143 Registrants do not need to 
undergo and wait for full licensure, but must comply with the same user 
protection, cybersecurity, and anti-money laundering requirements the Act 
imposes on licensees,144 and must register with FinCEN “to the extent that 
FinCEN’s regulations and guidance mandate registration.”145 Businesses 
with annual activity volumes exceeding $35,000 must be licensed in that 
state.146 Through formulating this three-tier system, the ULC hopes to 
encourage innovators in the cryptocurrency community, clarify “activity 
that should be licensed in order to avoid prosecution as an unlicensed 
money transmitter under 18 U.S.C. Section 1960,” and provide a path to 
bring exempt and registrant businesses “under state licensure and 
supervision” if their businesses eventually expand.147  
Though the CSBS Framework argues any “on-ramp” allowance 
would subject consumers to harm,148 the URVCBA’s tiered approach 
imposes satisfactory disclosure and consumer protection obligations on 
registrants.149 Thus, “registrants” do not completely escape oversight but 
can still benefit from less costly compliance and disclosure obligations. 
And, it is unlikely those with annual activity volume of $5,000 or less 
would significantly impact in-state residents. 
Permissible legislative variation could include a modest increase 
of (but should not substantially decrease) the monetary thresholds 
delineating the three licensing tiers. Though the aggregate amounts may 
seem small in isolation, as drafted in the URVCBA, the amount tolls 
separately for each individual state. 
                                                      
142 URVCBA, supra note 17, § 103. Aggregate dollar amount is in U.S.D. 
equivalency. See also URVCBA, supra note 17, §102 cmt. 11 at 24–25 (threshold 
amounts are calculated by equivalent value of given virtual currency as quoted on 
a U.S.-based virtual currency exchange for a particular date or period specified 
within the Act).  
143 URVCBA, supra note 17, at § 207. 
144 URVCBA, supra note 17, at § 102 cmt. 8. 
145 URVCBA, supra note 17, at § 207 cmt. 2. 
146 URVCBA, supra note 17, at § 102 cmt. 8. 
147 URVCBA, supra note 17, at § 103 cmt. 2. 
148 See supra note 114. 
149 See discussion supra notes 144–147. 
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Both the URVCBA150 and CSBS Framework151 recommend 
substantial disclosures at the application stage and periodically thereafter. 
Indeed, companies should clearly disclose information relating to their 
principals, assets, obligations, financial statements, standing of licenses 
held in other states, cybersecurity, customer residency verification, and 
AML programs. Such disclosures would provide state and federal 
regulators with sufficient information to assess the stability and suitability 
of a cryptocurrency business. Additionally, disclosures would protect 
consumers and ensure compliance with AML/BSA laws and tax 
obligations.  
 Many staunch opponents of New York and California’s 
(proposed) laws lament the disclosure obligations. Indeed, the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation has argued that Satoshi Nakamoto, the supposed 
creator of Bitcoin, would not have qualified for a California BitLicense 
because his real name, address, and identity are unknown to this day.152 
However, if the proposed URVCBA framework is adopted, the 
Nakamotos of the world need not fret. Unless future creators are 
transacting on a scale large enough to trigger “on-ramp” registrant status153 
or full licensure within a particular state, they would be exempt from all 
license-related compliance and disclosure requirements.154 However, 
should an individual or business conduct or facilitate cryptocurrency 
activity above the threshold, complying with disclosure and consumer 
protection measures is reasonable. 
Neither the URVCBA nor CSBS Model Framework require 
insurance against loss.155 But, cryptocurrency exchanges (particularly 
                                                      
150 See URVCBA, supra note 17, §§ 202–209 and §§ 302–307 (stating application 
and examination disclosures); see also id. § 501 (discussing disclosures and other 
protections for residents). 
151 See CSBS Framework, supra note 101, at 12–14 (outlining regulatory 
requirements). 
152 See Reitman, supra note 73 (“Bitcoin creator Satoshi Nakamoto would never 
have qualified for a license under California’s proposed virtual currency 
legislation [since-abandoned A.B. 1326].”). 
153 See URVCBA, supra note 17, § 207 cmt. 3 (“For the virtual-currency business, 
registration provides an ‘on-ramp’ to doing business within a new state.”). 
154 See URVCBA, supra note 17, § 102 cmt. 11 (describing a “full exemption” for 
those doing business at “annual volumes of activity less than $5,000”); see also 
Van Valkenburgh, supra note 118 (“Under the ULC's model act, precise and 
sensible definitions are laid out that specifically encompass only businesses [sic] 
models in which a third party takes control of user funds, because only in those 
situations can that third party then lose or steal the funds.”) (emphasis added). 
155 See URVCBA, supra note 17, §§ 202 and 501 (requiring a company to disclose 
whether it carries loss insurance, but not mandating it must guarantee loss 
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those maintaining control or custody over user’s cryptocurrency assets) 
face serious threats, including the potential to lose tens of millions of 
dollars in cryptoassets.156 While enhanced cybersecurity measures should 
mitigate these vulnerabilities, risk of breach by hackers or fund 
mismanagement by company insiders remains. Therefore, these 
businesses should maintain a minimal form of insurance to protect investor 
assets. While insurance would impose an additional cost, concern over 
increasing premiums might further encourage cryptocurrency businesses 
to act responsibility and exercise appropriate oversight. 
CONCLUSION 
Cryptocurrency is an innovative, disruptive technology.   While 
this technology is promising, it comes with many risks, including 
misinformed investments and use in criminal activities.  The utopia of a 
cryptocurrency trading scheme—especially one which closely resembles 
consumer-facing financial services—cannot continue unrestrained. 
Indeed, cryptocurrency exchanges act as intermediaries for most trading 
transactions, and themselves generate more risks. These include exposure 
to hackers and insider mismanagement. Regulation of these intermediaries 
is necessary for consumer protection, market stability, and prevention of 
illegal activity. But lawmakers should not stifle technological innovation 
with unduly burdensome regulation.  
Despite lacking “legal tender” status, decentralized 
cryptocurrency is a transferable store of value and functions like 
“currency” or “money.” Thus, regulating cryptocurrency businesses at the 
state level analogously to money transmitters is ideal. States are fully 
equipped to oversee such a regulatory scheme, and have successfully done 
so with fiat currency for decades. Unfortunately, the present status quo is 
unclear and inefficient.   
The most sensible regulation would follow the URVCBA; i.e., a 
multi-level licensing scheme with certain disclosure, reporting, and 
consumer protection requirements, including precise definitions and 
activity exemptions. This paper strongly suggests that states go beyond the 
URVCBA and require a form of insurance, especially from custodial 
cryptocurrency businesses.  
Unlike the CSBS Framework, the URVCBA was drafted to 
address concerns from a multitude of interested parties. Consequently, 
state and federal regulators and cryptocurrency businesses alike are more 
likely to view such oversight as reasonable. A URVCBA-type framework 
would resolve regulatory ambiguity surrounding the applicability of 
                                                      
insurance to customers); see also CSBS Framework, supra note 101, at 7 (“CSBS 
has not included cyber insurance in the final framework”). 
156 See discussion on Mt. Gox and BitFinex hacks supra note 51. 
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current Blue Sky money transmission laws, allow for sufficient oversight 
by state and federal regulators (as applicable), reduce burdensome 
compliance costs for cryptocurrency exchanges, and secure consumer 
protection. And—perhaps most importantly—the world will not miss out 
on the full potential of cryptocurrency technology.   
